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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78A-4-103 
(2010). 
STATUTES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-98(2) (1993): 
A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary 
partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or 
permanent total disability benefits is barred, unless an application for 
hearing is filed with the commission within six years after the date of the 
accident. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-78 (1993): 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be 
continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to 
time modify or change its former findings and orders. Records pertaining 
to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases of 
total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in 
Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
(3)(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the 
statutes of limitations contained in other sections of this chapter of Title 35, 
Chapter 2, the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law. 
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation 
referred to in Subsection (a) in any respect. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-10-6 and Section 35-10-7 (1993) 
Section 6: When it appears that an injured worker is or will be a disabled 
injured worker, or when the period of the injured worker's temporary total 
disability compensation exceeds 90 days, whichever comes first, the 
employer or its workers' compensation insurance carrier shall, within 30 
days thereafter file with the commission and serve on the injured worker an 
initial written report assessing the injured worker's need or lack of need for 
vocational assistance in reemployment. The employer or carrier shall also 
provide the injured worker information regarding employment. 
Section 7: When it appears that an injured worker is a disabled injured 
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worker, the employer or its workers' compensation insurance carrier shall 
within ten days of receiving the initial report, unless otherwise authorized 
by the commission, refer the disabled injured worker to the Utah State 
Office of Rehabilitation or, at the employer's or insurance carriers option to 
a private rehabilitation or reemployment service, to provide an evaluation 
and to develop a reemployment plan. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case involves the application of the statute of limitations to a claim for 
permanent total disability benefits arising out of an industrial accident which occurred on 
October 13, 1993, as well as the Labor Commission's continuing jurisdiction over such a 
claim. In addition, there is the issue of whether the equitable doctrines of laches and 
waiver can properly be applied to this case. 
Cecil W. Henningson injured his lower back while working as a roof bolter in a 
coal mine for Sunnyside Coal Company ("Sunnyside") in Carbon County, Utah. Prior to 
this injury, Mr. Henningson sustained low back injuries in several other significant 
industrial accidents during his employment with Kaiser Steel, the predecessor of 
Sunnyside. Sunnyside and its workers compensation insurance carrier, the Workers 
Compensation Fund (WCF), accepted liability and paid Mr. Henningson temporary total 
disability benefits through December 1994 and permanent partial disability cbenefits 
through June 1995. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Henningson filed an Application for Hearing with the Labor Commission on 
March 14, 2007 requesting permanent total disability compensation for the low back 
2 
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injury he sustained on October 13, 1993. (R. at 1-12.) On May 10, 2007 he filed an 
Amended Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor Commission ("Commission"), 
clarifying that the date of the accident was October 13, 1993. (R. at 25.) 
Sunnyside and WCF, and Employers' Reinsurance Fund (ERF) separately, filed 
Answers to Mr. Henningson's Application for Hearing in which they denied that he was 
entitled to permanent total disability benefits. (R. at 15-19, 20-23.) On July 3, 2007, 
Sunnyside and WCF filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and an accompanying 
memorandum in which they argued that Mr. Henningson5 s claim was barred by section 
35-1-98(2) (1993) of the Utah Code. (R. at 39-83). ERF joined in that motion. (R. at 136-
37). On August 15, 2007, the Administrative Law Judge Debbie L. Hann issued an Order 
denying Sunny side's motion. (R. at 131-35.) 
A hearing was held on Mr. Henningson's application on August 20, 2007. (R. at 
338.) Several months later, the Administrative Law Judge issued her Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order in which she awarded Mr. Henningson permanent total 
disability benefits for the low back injury he sustained on October 13, 1993. (R. at 166-
73.) Sunnyside and WCF, and ERF separately, filed motions for review challenging the 
Administrative Law Judge's award of benefits. (R. at 174-206, 207-313.) 
III. Disposition by the Labor Commission 
On December 27, 2010, the Labor Commission issued its Order on Motion for 
Review affirming the award of permanent total disability compensation to Mr. 
Henningson. (R. at 330-36.) The Labor Commission cited to Vigos v. Mountainland 
Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, 993 P.2d 207, and held that Mr. Henningson's claim satisfied 
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the limitations period in Utah Code Annotated section 35-1-98(2) (1993) because, like 
the employer and insurance carrier in Vigos, Sunnyside and WCF paid substantial 
disability benefits and medical expenses within six years of the accident. (R. at 332.) 
Furthermore, the Labor Commission noted that required reports regarding Mr. 
Henningson's claims were filed in a timely manner, just like in Vigos. (R. at 332.) The 
Labor Commission also concluded that it had continuing jurisdiction to modify Mr. 
Henningson's prior award under Utah Code Annotated section 35-1-78 (1993) because it 
was inadequate. (R. at 333.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Henningson sustained a low back injury on December 4, 1981 while working 
at Kaiser Steel, the predecessor of Sunnyside Coal Company. This lifting injury required 
Mr. Henningson to undergo surgery to repair a level L4-5 herniated disc. (R. at 337, pp. 
79-84.) As a result of this industrial injury, Dr. Richard Jackson gave Mr. Henningson a 
5% whole person impairment rating. (R. at 337, p. 80.) The workers compensation 
insurer paid all benefits, including medical, temporary total disability, and permanent 
partial disability. (R. at 208.) Forms were filed with the Labor Commission and the 
employer. (R. at 337, p. 100-04.) 
2. Mr. Henningson suffered another injury on July 18, 1987 while working at Kaiser 
Steel. He fell 6 feet from scaffolding and again injured his lower back. He underwent 
another surgery to repair another herniated disc, this time at level L5-S1. (R. at 337, p. 
90.) The workers compensation insurer again paid all appropriate benefits, including a 
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15% whole person impairment. (R. at 167.) Again, numerous forms were filed with the 
WCF and the Utah Labor Commission. (R. at 337, pp. 92-98.) 
3. Mr. Henningson suffered other industrial injuries to his lower back while working 
for Kaiser Steel—specifically, on October 1, 1979 (R. at 337, pp. 106, 185-187), 
November 12, 1979 (R. at 337, p. 107), and September 6, 1993 (R. at 337, pp. 48-62). 
4. Mr. Henningson again injured his lower back while in the course and scope of his 
employment with Sunnyside Coal Company on October 13, 1993. (R. at 208.) He was 
lifting a 100 plus pound stopper, a piece of machinery used by a roof bolter in the mine. 
(R. at 25; 338, p. 5:6-17.) 
5. As a result of this injury, Mr. Henningson underwent a two level surgical fusion 
using internal fixation (i.e. rods and screws from the lumbar at level 4 to the sacrum). (R. 
at 337, p. 110). 
6. The workers compensation insurer again paid all benefits, including medicals 
benefits, temporary total disability benefits, and permanent partial disability benefits of a 
22% whole person impairment rating given by Dr. Momberger. (R. at 208; 337, pp. 51-
55.) Again, numerous forms were filed with the Utah Labor Commission, Industrial 
Accident Division and the WCF. (R. at 337, pp. 6, 15, 30, 33-42, 109-15.) 
7. Dr. Momberger requested vocational assistance for the Petitioner from the 
Workers Compensation Fund. (R. at 337, pp. 51-55.) However, the Workers 
Compensation Fund never granted vocational assistance to Mr. Henningson. (R. at 338, 
p. 28:3-5.) 
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8. Mr. Henningson started working at Kaiser/Sunnyside Coal in 1972 and was 
terminated in 1993 due to his industrial accident. (R. at 338, p. 23). 
9. Mr. Henningson, finished the ninth (9th) grade in school. (R. at 338, p. 22:10-16.) 
He has difficulty reading, has never read an entire book, and is a poor speller. (R. at 162; 
338, p. 22-23.). According to Mr. Henningson's own vocational expert, Dina Galli, Mr. 
Henningson lacks transferrable skills and the capacity to retrain for a new vocation. (R. at 
165.) 
10. In December 1993, Dr. Alan L. Colledge stated, "I believe his degenerative 
cascade from his prior two discectomies [industrial accidents of December 4, 1981 and 
July 18, 1987] have certainly predisposed him for what he has now. I believe that had he 
not had those, he would not have been in the condition he is at now." (R. at 337, p. 34.) 
11. In January 1994, Mr. Henningson's treating physician, Dr. Momberger, indicated 
that, on a scale from 1 to 10, Mr. Henningson's pain level averaged 4.5 and at its worst 
was a 10. (R. at 337, p. 112.) In December 1994, Dr. Momberger determined that Mr. 
Henningson fit into the category of "light to light medium work," indicated that his 
condition was "permanent," and stated that, once his other skills were considered, "the 
decision of his employability can then be decided." (R. 338, p. 52.) 
12. In May 1994, Mr. Henningson applied for Social Security disability benefits. (R. 
at 4.) On April 28, 1995, the Social Security Administration determined that Mr. 
Henningson had been under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act and 
Regulations since October 14, 1993. (R. at 7.) The Social Security Administration also 
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recommended that "the implementing component conduct continuing disability reviews 
at the soonest possible opportunity as the claimant's return to work is near." (R. at 8.) 
13. In February 1997, Dr. Colledge noted in a disability insurance form that Mr. 
Henningson was permanently disabled and unable to work since 1993, but also noted that 
Mr. Henningson's prognosis was "good." (R. at 9). 
14. In 1997, Dr. David R. Heiner noted that Mr. Henningson reported his back pain 
as a 3 on a scale from 1 to 5, and that his pain is "throbbing and present pretty much all of 
the time." (R. at 337, p. 88A.). Dr. Heiner also noted that the pain had "been present over 
the years and is worsening with time." (R. at 337, p. 88A.) 
15. In August 2007, prior to the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, Dr. 
Heiner indicated on a Physician's Assessment Form that in a typical 8-hour work day, 
Mr. Henningson would be able to stand for 20 minutes total and 15 minutes at any one 
time. (R. at 337, p. 88C.) Dr. Heiner also indicated that Mr. Henningson could lift only 5 
pounds frequently, 10 pounds occasionally, and 20 pounds rarely. (R. at 337, p. 88C.) 
Dr. Heiner specifically wrote that Mr. Henningson should not "stoop, bend, lift, crawl, 
climb, walk longer than lhr, stand > 15 minutes." (R. at 337, p. 88C.) 
16. In August 2007, at the hearing with the Administrative Law Judge, Mr. 
Henningson reported that he had more pain in his back and legs. (R. at 338, p. 32:8-14.) 
Mr. Henningson also reported that his pain level was a 7 or 8 on a scale of 0 to 10. (R. at 
338, p. 34:11-20.) Furthermore, Mr. Henningson reported difficulty with sleeping, 
getting nauseated, feeling hopeless, and even considering taking his own life. (R. at 338, 
p. 33:2-24.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Labor Commission correctly concluded that Mr. Henningson5 s claim for 
permanent total disability compensation is not barred by the statute of limitations in Utah 
Code Annotated section 35-1-98(2) (1993). In Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 
2000 UT 2, 993 P.2d 207, the Utah Supreme court held that a claim for permanent total 
disability benefits is not barred where all relevant parties and the Commission are given 
notice of (1) the material facts on which the claim asserted is to depend and (2) whom the 
claim is asserted against, within the six-year limitations period. Other cases predating 
Vigos have similarly held. Here, Mr. Henningson's claim for permanent total disability 
is not barred because all necessary forms were filed and significant benefits paid to Mr. 
Henningson within the six-year limitations period. 
The Labor Commission correctly concluded that its exercise of continuing 
jurisdiction over Mr. Henningson's claim for permanent total disability was proper. Utah 
Code Annotated section 35-1-78 (1993) provides that the jurisdiction of the Commission 
over each case shall be continuing. Utah case law has interpreted section 35-1-78 to 
mean that, once the limitations period in section 35-1-98(2) is satisfied, the Commission 
obtains continuing jurisdiction over the claim and may modify an award of disability 
benefits where it is shown that there is a significant change or new development in the 
injury or that the previous award was inadequate. Here, the Labor Commission had 
continuing jurisdiction to modify Mr. Henningson9 s previous award of temporary total 
and permanent partial disability benefits because the limitations period in section 35-1-
98(2) was satisfied. Moreover, the Labor Commission's grant of permanent total 
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disability benefits to Mr. Henningson was proper because there was proof that the 
previous award was inadequate. 
The equitable doctrines of laches and waiver do not preclude Mr. Henningson's 
claim as ERF contends. First, the equitable doctrines of laches and waiver are not 
applicable to claims before the Labor Commission. However, even if this Court finds 
that laches and waiver are applicable, the required elements of such defenses are not 
present in this case. To succeed in a laches defense, a defendant must establish that (1) 
the claimant unreasonably delayed in bringing his claim and that (2) the defendant was 
prejudiced by such a delay. Here, Mr. Henningson did not unreasonably delay in 
bringing his claim because he met the six-year limitations requirement in section 35-1-
98(2). Additionally, even if there was an unreasonable delay, ERF was not prejudiced 
because (1) as a reinsurer it was not entitled to initial notice of Mr. Henningson's injuries, 
and (2) there is no problem with stale evidence since there is ample evidence that ERF 
may examine and from which it may raise defenses. 
Furthermore, policy considerations favor Mr. Henningson's award of permanent 
total disability. The workers compensation scheme was established to provide remedies 
to workers injured in the course of their employment, irrespective of fault, in lieu of 
common law tort actions. The goal was to place the burden of compensating for 
workplace injuries on businesses and their insurance carriers. Accordingly, Utah courts 
have held that the Workers Compensation Act should be liberally construed and applied 
in favor of finding employee coverage. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, this Court 
should affirm the Labor Commission's award of permanent total disability benefits to Mr. 
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Henningson. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LABOR COMMISSION CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT MR. 
HENNINGSON'S CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY 
COMPENSATION IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 35-1-98(2) 
Appellants Employers5 Reinsurance Fund (ERF), Workers Compensation Fund 
(WCF), and Sunnyside Coal Company ("Sunnyside") (collectively, the "Appellants") 
have argued that Utah Code Annotated section 35-1-98(2) (1993)1 bars Mr. Henningson's 
claim for permanent total disability compensation. Section 35-1-98(2) (1993) provides: 
(2) A claim for compensation for . . . permanent total disability benefits is 
barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the commission 
within six years after the date of the accident. 
Specifically, Appellants assert that, under this provision, Mr. Henningson's March 14, 
2007 claim for permanent total disability benefits is barred because he did not file a 
formal "application for hearing" within six years of his accident. Appellants misinterpret 
the meaning and application of the limitations period in section 35-1-98(2). 
In Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, 993 P.2d, the Utah Supreme 
Court specifically addressed the meaning and application of the limitations period in 
section 35-1-98(2). In that case, a construction worker, Vigos, fell and injured his head 
and back while working for his employer in October 1988. Id. If 2. Shortly after his 
accident, an "Employer's Report of Injury" and a "Physician's Initial Report of Work 
1
 Because Mr. Henningson was injured in 1993, the applicable workers' compensation statutory scheme for his 
claims is Utah Code Ann. title 35, chapter 1, as amended in 1993. 
2
 In Vigos, the Utah Supreme Court examined section 35-1-99(3) (1988), the substantial equivalent of 35-1-98(2) 
(1993). The Legislature relocated and renamed section 35-1-99(3) as: section 35-1-98(2) in 1990, section 35A-3-
417(2) in 1996, and section 34A-2-417(2) in 1997. See Vigos at If 1, n.l. 
10 
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Injury or Occupational Disease" were filed with both the WCF and the Commission. IdL ^ 
2, 12. The WCF voluntarily granted Vigos temporary total disability benefits through 
May 1989 and covered his related medical expenses through July 1989. Id. ^[3. 
Between 1989 and 1994, Vigos attempted to work various jobs, but was unable to 
hold any of them due to injuries sustained in his 1988 accident. Id. f^ 4. In January 1994, 
Vigos filed for social security disability benefits, which were denied twice before being 
awarded in June 1995. Id. In July 1995, six years and nine months after his accident, 
"Vigos filed an 'Application for Hearing—Form 00 V with the Commission requesting 
medical expenses, temporary and permanent total disability benefits, and travel 
expenses." Id. f 5. An administrative law judge dismissed Vigos's workers 
compensation claim because it was made more than six years after his accident. IdL The 
Commission and Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and held that section 35-1-98(2) did not bar 
Vigos's claim for permanent total disability benefits where ".. . the required forms were 
filed, disability benefits paid and medical expenses compensated before the six-year 
period ended." Id Tf 25. The Vigos court reasoned that "there is no need for a formal 
claim or application for hearing under section [35-1-98(2)] if the Commission's 
jurisdiction is otherwise established." Id ^ 16. The court went on to state: 
[T]his court has long recognized that a claim for compensation need not 
bear any particular formality. In fact, great liberality as to form and 
substance of an application for compensation is to be indulged. However 
informal the claim may be, it need only give notice to the parties and to the 
commission of the material facts on which the right asserted is to depend 
and against whom the claim is made. 
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Id 117 (quoting Utah State Ins. Fund v. Dutson. 646 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1982)) 
(emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted). 
Other Utah Supreme Court cases have similarly held that there is no need to file a 
formal application for hearing to meet the limitations period in section 35-1-98(2). See, 
e.g., Mecham v. Indus. Common, 692 P.2d 783, 785 (Utah 1984) (holding that "[s]ection 
[35-1-98(2)] is designed solely to create jurisdiction in the [Labor] Commission and there 
is no need for any particular formality, as long as notice is given"); Christensen v. 
Spanish Fork City, 2000 UT 13, ^ 2, 8, 994 P.2d 1252 (holding that an injured worker 
"filed a timely claim that would serve as the functional equivalent of an application for 
hearing" where he "applied for, and received, temporary total disability benefits from [his 
employer's] workers5 compensation carrier"); Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 
209 P.2d 571, 574 (Utah 1949) (Wolfe, J., concurring) (stating that "the jurisdiction of 
the commission may be invoked by such conduct of the parties which is equivalent to the 
filing of a claim"). 
In the present case, just like the insurer and employer in Vigos, Appellants 
accepted the industrial accident of Mr. Henningson, filed all the necessary forms, paid 
significant benefits, and compensated Mr. Henningson for his related medical expenses 
before the six-year period ended. Mr. Henningson5s case meets exactly the same 
conditions as Vigos 5s case with regard to notice to the parties and to the Commission. As 
such, Mr. Henningson has satisfied the requirements of section 35-1-98(2) and therefore 
has unlimited time to bring further necessary adjudication before the Commission for 
permanent total disability benefits. 
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In an effort to distinguish Vigos from the present case, Appellants have argued 
that, unlike Vigos, Mr. Henningson knew that he was permanently and totally disabled 
within the six-year statutory period and therefore had an obligation to file a formal claim 
for permanent total disability during that period. However, there is nothing in the 
language of section 35-1-98(2) (or the language of section 35-1-78 discussed below) that 
indicates that an injured worker's time limit for filing a claim is based upon when he 
knew or should have known he had a claim for additional compensation. Although the 
Vigos court mentions that Vigos attempted to work and rehabilitate himself during the 
period after he received temporary total disability compensation, these facts were not 
dispositive to the court's reasoning and interpretation of the operation of section 35-1-98 
and 35-1-78. Instead, the Vigos court held that the dispositive fact in determining 
whether a claimant has satisfied the limitations period in 35-1-98(2) is whether the 
Commission and the parties received notice of "the material facts on which the right 
asserted is to depend and against whom the claim is made." Id. at f^ 17. Besides, even in 
Vigos, Vigos's attempts to work and rehabilitate himself were unsuccessful, suggesting 
that he was, in fact, permanently and totally disabled from the time of his injury even 
though it was not initially recognized. 
Cases predating Vigos also support the notion that a claimant's knowledge or 
awareness of the extent of his disability during the six-year period following his accident 
3
 Interestingly, in their original Answer to Mr. Henningson's complaint dated April 12, 2007, Appellants alleged that 
Mr. Henningson was not permanently totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident. (R. at 16.) Appellants 
now wish to argue that Mr. Henningson was indeed permanently and totally disabled in an effort to distinguish the 
present case from the facts in Vigos. 
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is irrelevant. For example, in Mecham,4 the Utah Supreme Court held that a worker's 
claim for permanent total disability benefits made twenty years after her industrial 
accident was not barred by section 35-1-98(2) where the Industrial Commission5 received 
notice of her injury and a physician's report within days of the accident. 692 P.2d at 785. 
In that case, the worker, Mecham, was injured in an industrial accident on October 31, 
1961 and received permanent partial disability benefits through December 1964. Id. at 
784. More than twenty years after the accident, in December 1982, Mecham obtained 
new counsel and filed a formal petition for permanent total disability and reimbursement 
of medical expenses. Id, at 785. The Mecham court held that "once a claim or notice is 
filed in accordance with section [35-1-98] . . . , the individual sections of the Workers' 
Compensation Act dealing with several types of disability must be consulted for their 
varying statutes of limitations." Id. The court then concluded that "Mecham's claim for 
permanent total disability [was] governed by section 35-1-67 which contained] no 
limitation." Id. 
The Mecham court explained that "[sjection [35-1-98] is designed solely to create 
jurisdiction in the Industrial Commission, and there is no need for any particular 
formality, as long as notice is given," and that "[o]nce jurisdiction is established, the 
nature of the claim dictates what statute of limitation applies." Id. at 785 (citing Dean 
Evans Chrysler v.Morse, 692 P.2d 783 (Utah 1984); Utah State Insur. Fund, 646 P.2d 
707). Likewise, in Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel 965 P.2d 583 (Utah Ct. App. 
4In Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel 965 P.2d 583 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed that Mecham 
was still controlling. IcL at 587 ("we believe that [Mecham] is still controlling in this case"). 
5
 The Industrial Commission later became the Labor Commission. 
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1998), the Utah Court of Appeals held, "[s]ection 35-1-67 provides for permanent total 
disability and is silent as to any limitation period; thus, only the section 35-1-98 six-year 
filing requirement applies as to any time limitation for the purposes of section 35-1-67." 
Id at 587; see also Vigos, 2000 UT 2, ^ 14 (referring to the equivalent of section 35-1-
98(2) and stating, "Prior to enactment of this provision in 1988, the Act had no statute of 
limitations for permanent total disability claims"); Buxton v. Indus. Comm'n, 587 P.2d 
121, 122-123 (Utah 1978) (referring to section 35-1-99, the equivalent of 35-1-98(2), and 
stating, "The only limitations of actions statute which has application to permanent total 
disability claims is Section 99 of the Act"). 
Thus, according to Mecham and applicable provisions of the Workers 
Compensation Act, there is no set time limit for filing a claim for permanent total 
disability benefits once the notice requirements of section 35-1-98 have been met.6 
Furthermore, once section 35-1-98 is satisfied, the continuing jurisdiction of the 
Commission is triggered by section 35-1-78. See Mecham, 692 P.2d at 786 (stating, 
"Read in harmony, sections 35-1-67 and 35-1-78, allow Mecham to file at any time her 
petition for permanent total disability provided that disability arises from the original 
injury."). Neither the Mecham court nor the Vigos court indicated that a claimant's 
knowledge of his level of disability within the six-year period following his accident is 
relevant in determining whether the statute of limitations in section 35-1-98 is satisfied. 
Nevertheless, there are valid reasons why Mr. Henningson did not attempt to file a 
6
 In fact, even a report produced by Deloitte Consulting LLP on behalf of Employers' Reinsurance Fund states: 
"Since there is no statute of limitations on PTD [permanent total disability] claims, these claimants may qualify 
for ERF reimbursement." See Employers' Reinsurance Fund's Actuarial Review of the Unpaid Claim Liability & 
Projected Financial Statements as of June 30, 2009, at 13, attached hereto as Addendum C (emphasis added). 
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formal claim for permanent total disability with the Commission in the immediate years 
after his accident. By law, Mr. Henningson could not receive permanent and total 
disability benefits before he reached maximum medical improvement and therefore had 
no reason to file until stabilization occurred. See Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor 
Common, 2001 UT App 370, If 25-26, 38 P. 3d 969. The facts indicate that Mr. 
Henningson did not even reach maximum medical improvement—was not even 
stabilized—until December 1994. (R. at 167; 337, p. 51.) 
Additionally, the WCF paid Mr. Henningson temporary total disability through 
December 1994 and permanent partial disability through June 1995. (R. at 208.) Mr. 
Henningson had no need to file a claim for additional benefits while his workers 
compensation carrier was presently paying him disability. No reasonable injured worker 
would have filed for permanent total disability while the injured worker was still 
receiving compensation benefits, recovering from his accident, and making 
improvements—especially when the injured worker had not yet received Social Security 
disability. 
It is customary and almost even necessary to receive Social Security disability 
before filing for workers compensation because the standards for social security disability 
are more readily met than workers compensation standards—especially since there is no 
opposing counsel. Moreover, due to differences between the procedural rules for social 
security disability and workers compensation benefits, it is less risky to apply for 
permanent total disability benefits from the SSA than the Labor Commission. With 
Social Security Disability, if you are denied, you may reapply immediately. This is not 
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the case with workers compensation with regard to permanent and total disability. 
Although Mr. Henningson received disability benefits from the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) on April 28, 1995 after being denied twice (his initial application 
and reconsideration were denied), Mr. Henningson should not be punished for receiving 
these disability benefits. Sunny side and the WCF granted Mr. Henningson only 
temporary total disability and permanent partial disability benefits, which required him to 
seek financial assistance elsewhere. As the Utah Court of Appeals noted in Burgess, the 
"[continuing jurisdiction [of the Commission], in the long run, should . . . serve the 
[employer's and the WCF's] interests by, in effect, encouraging an injured worker to seek 
a more conservative course of treatment or no treatment rather than feeling compelled to 
try everything within a six-year period." 965 P.2d at 588-89. Likewise, here, the 
continuing jurisdiction of the Commission served Sunnyside's and WCF's interests by 
encouraging Mr. Henningson to seek a more conservative disability award initially (e.g. 
temporary total, permanent partial, and social security disability benefits) rather than 
feeling compelled to get everything he possible could within a six-year period. 
II. THE LABOR COMMISSION CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT ITS 
EXERCISE OF CONTINUING JURISDICTION OVER MR. HENNINGSON'S 
CLAIM WAS PROPER. 
A. The Labor Commission's continuing jurisdiction was proper 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-78 (1993) provides for the continuing 
jurisdiction of the Commission: 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be 
continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to 
time modify or change its former findings and orders. Records pertaining 
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to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases of 
total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in 
Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
(3)(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the 
statutes of limitations contained in other sections of this chapter of Title 35, 
Chapter 2, the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law. 
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation 
referred to in Subsection (a) in any respect. 
The Utah Supreme Court has provided clear guidance as to the meaning and 
application of section 35-1-78. For example, in Vigos, the Utah Supreme Court held that, 
"[b]ecause Vigos satisfied the statute of limitations in section [35-1-98(2)], the powers 
and jurisdiction of the commission over his case are continuing, as the language of 
section 35-1-78 plainly states." 2000 UT 2, J^ 31 (internal quotation marks omitted). In 
other words, "subsection 35-1-78(1) gives the Commission continuing jurisdiction, even 
after the limitations period has run, if jurisdiction over the claim was established before 
the statute ran." Id. ^ 29. The Vigos court noted that "[t]he Commission has been held to 
have jurisdiction when all the appropriate parties were aware of the material, 
jurisdictional facts upon which the workers' compensation claim was based . . . and the 
purpose and intent of the workers9 compensation jurisdictional statutes were fulfilled." 
Id. If 24 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
In Ortega v. Meadow Valley Construction, 2000 UT 24, 996 P.2d 1039, the Utah 
Supreme came to the same conclusion as it did in Vigos. The Ortega court stated that 
"the beneficial effect of continuing jurisdiction is to keep the worker's opportunity for 
additional benefits alive where he has once complied with the six-year statute of 
limitations." Ortega, 2000 UT 24, f 10. The Ortega court explained that section 35-1-78 
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logically leads to this conclusion when taken as a whole: 
Our interpretation is supported by the provision in section 35-1-78 which 
reads, "records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for 
ten years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a 
claim has been filed as in section 35-1-98 may be destroyed at the 
discretion of the commission." It appears that there would have been no 
reason to prevent the destruction of records pertaining to cases "of total 
permanent disability" or "cases in which a claim has been filed as in section 
35-1-98" unless the commission had continuing jurisdiction to reexamine 
those cases beyond the ten-year period. 
nin. 
In the present case, Mr. Henningson has satisfied the limitations period set forth in 
section 35-1-98(2) because all the appropriate parties were made aware of the material, 
jurisdictional facts upon which his workers compensation claim is based. That is, once 
all the necessary forms were filed, Sunny side, WCF, and the Commission became aware 
of Mr. Henningson's injuries soon after his accident. Furthermore, Sunnyside and WCF 
acknowledged his workers compensation claim by voluntarily paying significant benefits 
to Mr. Henningson—temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits—and 
compensating him for his related medical expenses, all within the six-year period. 
Furthermore, despite Appellants' contention to the contrary, there is no time limit 
to the Commissions continuing jurisdiction. In fact, the Vigos court pointed out that such 
a policy benefits both employers and employees alike: 
Section 35-1-78 imposes no time limit on the Commission's continuing 
jurisdiction. Indeed, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, the 
authoritative treatise on workers' compensation, notes that Utah is in "an 
important minority of states [that] permit reopening for changed condition 
at any time'" That policy benefits both employers and employees. 
Disability benefits may be decreased in favor of an employer or increased 
to benefit an injured worker when circumstances warrant. It would be 
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unfairly discriminatory to allow a reduction of benefits under the 
continuing jurisdiction statute but not allow an increase in benefits to 
employees after the specified period has run. . . . Since Vigos satisfied the 
statute of limitations in section [35-1-98(2)], the Commission had 
continuing jurisdiction pursuant to section 35-1-48 [sic] over his request for 
additional benefits. 
2000 UT 2, Tf 27 (citing Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' 
Compensation Law § 78.10 (1998)) (second emphasis added). 
In Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 733 P.2d 158 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court also provided the rationale behind the absence of a time limit for a 
claim for permanent and total disability. The Spencer court stated, "Inherent in the 
Workmen's Compensation Act is the recognition that industrial injuries cannot 
always be diagnosed with absolute accuracy, nor their consequences predicted with 
complete certainty, and therefore the rule of res judicata is not ordinarily applicable * 
in proceedings of this kind." 733 P.2d at 161 (citing Mollerup Van Lines v. Adams, 
398 P.2d 882 (Utah 1965)). Thus, as the foregoing cases so held, section 35-1-78 
grants the Commission continuing jurisdiction over Mr. Henningson's claim because 
Mr. Henningson satisfied the statute of limitations in section 35-1-98(2). 
B. Once the Labor Commission obtains continuing jurisdiction, it may modify 
an award if there is (1) evidence of some significant change or new 
development in a claimant's injury or (2) proof of the previous awards 
inadequacy 
Section 35-1-78 "empowers the Commission to make such modification of former 
findings and orders as i n its opinion may be justified.55' Buxton, 587 P.2d at 123; see 
also Mecham„ 692 P.2d at 786 ("The Industrial Commission has continuing jurisdiction 
under section 35-1-78 of the Act to modify awards if in its opinion it is justified."). 
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Moreover, "[t]he power of the [Labor] Commission to modify awards when 'in its 
opinion' modification is justified is not an arbitrary power . . . but a power wedded to the 
duty to examine credible evidence." Spencer, 733 P.2d at 161. Accordingly, to modify 
a claim, section 35-1-78 has been interpreted to require (1) "evidence of some significant 
change or new development in the claimant's injury" or (2) "proof of the previous 
award's inadequacy." Buxton, 587 P.2d at 123; see also Ortega, 2000 UT 24, ^ 10 
(stating the same); Spencer, 733 P.2d at 161 ("Under well-established principles of stare 
decisis, the basis of modification is provided by evidence of some significant change or 
new development in the claimant's injury or proof of the previous award's inadequacy."). 
In the present case, there is (1) evidence of a significant change or new 
development in Mr. Henningson's injury, and (2) proof of the previous award's 
inadequacy. Nevertheless, Mr. Henningson needs to meet only one of these two 
requirements to empower the commission to properly modify his award. 
i) The Prior Award was Inadequate 
This Court should find that the prior award was inadequate. First, Appellants 
themselves have vigorously argued before this Court that Mr. Henningson was 
permanently and totally disabled since the time of his injury—despite granting Mr. 
Henningson only temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits at that time. 
Second, Labor Commissioner Hayashi herself upheld the Administrative Law Judge's 
decision to grant Mr. Henningson permanent total disability benefits based on a finding 
that the previous award was inadequate. (Addendum B at 4.) Commissioner Hayashi 
also noted in her findings of fact that "Sunnyside and the ERF concede that Mr. 
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Henningson is now permanently and totally disabled.'5 (Addendum B at 2.) Finally, 
despite the Social Security Administration "implementing component conduct continuing 
disability reviews at the soonest possible opportunity as the claimant's return to work is 
near" in April 1995 (R. at 8), the Social Security Administration has continued to pay Mr. 
Henningson disability benefits. This suggests that Mr. Henningson's condition is more 
permanent than originally thought and therefore supports a finding that the original award 
for temporary total and permanent partial disability was inadequate. 
ii) There is evidence of some significant change or new development in Mr. 
Henningson }s injury 
Even if this Court determines that Mr. Henningson's original award of temporary 
total and permanent partial disability benefits was not inadequate, this Court should, at a 
minimum, find that he is now permanently and totally disabled and therefore there has 
been a significant change or new development in his injury. 
Here, there is evidence of some significant change in Mr. Henningson's injury 
affecting his ability to perform remunerative employment. First, Mr. Henningson's 
physical condition has deteriorated since his original award. In his affidavit, Mr. 
Henningson acknowledged his increased level of pain, his inability to engage in as many 
activities as before, his need to lie down more often, his continued loss of strength, and 
his decreased range of motion. (R. at 338, p. 34-35.) Mr. Henningson's worsened 
condition is further evidenced by his decreased level of mobility and activity. It is 
increasingly difficult for him to bend over and he no longer is able to do dishes or mow 
his lawn. (R. at 98.) Mr. Henningson's worsening condition has also required him to 
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take more pain medication (Oxycodone), and spend more time in his hot tub to relieve his 
back pain. (R. at 338, p. 20:10-11.) 
Second, Mr. Henningson's psychological condition has changed due to increased 
depression related to his injury. Mr. Henningson experiences symptoms ranging from 
trouble sleeping and irritability, to hopelessness and even thinking about taking his own 
life. (R. at 99; 338, p. 33:2-24.) Mr. Henningson's depression has been aggravated by 
several factors: (1) the loss of hope of ever feeling better (R. at 98; 338, p. 33:16-24), (2) 
the realization of the permanence of his condition (R. at 98), and (3) the unlikelihood of a 
medical breakthrough to cure his condition. 
Additionally, "[i]t is . . . well-established law that benefits are awarded on the 
basis of disability, not physical impairment, and that a claimant's disability may be found 
to be total if he can no longer perform the duties of the character required in his 
occupation prior to his injury." Spencer, 733 P.2d at 161 (citing Hardman v. Salt Lake 
City Fleet Mgmt, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986); Marshall v. Indus. Comm'n, 681 P.2d 208 
(Utah 1984); Northwest Carriers, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 639 P.2d 138 (Utah 1981)). 
Thus, "[t]he [Labor] Commission has a duty to determine from competent evidence 
whether a claimant's loss of function represents total disability in terms of capacity to 
perform remunerative employment." Spencer, 733 P.2d at 161. Furthermore, that 
"determination should encompass such factors as the education, mental capacity, and age 
of the claimant." Id at 161. 
When taking into account such factors as Mr. Henningson's education, mental 
capacity, and age—as well as the premise that disability is measured by the inability to 
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find remunerative employment—significant changes or new developments in Mr. 
Henningson5 s condition become even more prevalent. As to education and mental 
capacity, Mr. Henningson has finished only the ninth (9th) grade in school. (R. at 338, p. 
22:10-16.) As stated, he has difficulty reading, has never read an entire book, and is a 
poor speller. (R. at 162; 338, p. 22-23.). According to his own vocational report, Mr. 
Henningson lacks transferrable skills and the capacity to retrain for a new vocation. (R. at 
165.) In an increasingly competitive employment market, where education is more 
important than ever, Mr. Henningson5 s lack of education and mental capacity has 
drastically reduced his likelihood of finding and performing remunerative employment. 
His depression further hinders his ability to find and perform remunerative employment. 
As to age, in 1993 the Petitioner was 39; now he is over 52 years old. The Social 
Security Administration, like the Spencer court, recognizes age as a determinative factor 
in considering disability. The SSA places each applicant in one of five categories: those 
ages (1) 18 to 44; (2) 45 to 49; (3) 50 to 54; (4) 55 to 59; and (5) 60 to 64. See 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1563. As an applicant advances in age, the SSA recognizes greater physical, 
mental (psychological), and social limitations and reduces the requirements for a finding 
of disability accordingly. See id.; see generally Patterson v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1455 (11th 
Cir. 1986). 
Therefore, in the event this Court finds that Mr. Henningson5 s original disability 
award was not inadequate, it should, at a minimum, find that there was a significant 
change or new development in Mr. Henningson5s injury. 
24 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
III. THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINES OF LACHES AND WAIVER DO NOT 
PRECLUDE MR. HENNINGSON'S CLAIM 
A. The equitable defenses of laches and waiver are not applicable 
Appellant, ERF, contends that the equitable doctrines of laches and waiver 
preclude Mr. Henningson's claim. However, equitable defenses, such as laches and 
waiver, are inapplicable to claims before the Labor Commission. In Bevans v. Industrial 
Commission, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals held that the 
Industrial Commission, the predecessor to the Labor Commission, did not have statutory 
authority to reduce the amount of workers compensation benefits awarded to an 
employee where an administrative law judge felt that equity demanded such a result. In 
that case, the employee was injured in an automobile accident during the course of his 
employment and received compensation from both his employer (under the workers 
compensation laws) and the employer's no-fault auto insurer. Id. at 574. The 
administrative law judge ordered that the amount of compensation required from the 
employer be reduced by the amount the employee retained from the auto insurer because 
"equity demanded" it. Id. at 575. 
However, on review, the Utah Court of Appeals vacated the order and held that 
such an equitable determination by the administrative law judge was inappropriate. The 
Bevans court stated that "the Industrial Commission remains a statutorily-created agency, 
not a court of equity." IdL at 576. As such, the court concluded that "the Industrial 
Commission has only those powers expressly or impliedly granted to it by the 
legislature." Id, The Bevans court noted that "there is no provision in the Utah workers' 
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compensation statute expressly or impliedly authorizing any reduction of workers5 
compensation benefits by amounts received by an employee . . . from his or her . . . 
employer's no fault insurer." Id. at 577. 
In the present case, the Labor Commission remains a statutorily-created agency, 
not a court of equity. As such, it has only those powers expressly or impliedly granted to 
it by the legislature and does not have authority to consider equitable defenses—at least 
in as much as it does not have authority to grant equitable relief as the Be vans court held. 
Accordingly, ERFs equitable defenses of laches and waiver are inapplicable in the 
present administrative action. 
Lastly, from a practical standpoint, the WCF and ERF have done no vocational 
rehabilitation regarding Mr. Henningson—as mandated under Utah Code Annotated 
sections 35-10-6 and 35-10-7 (1993). Neither did they tell Mr. Henningson about the 
possibility of a permanent and total disability claim. Nevertheless, ERF now seeks to 
argue the equitable doctrine laches to avoid paying additional benefits. 
B. Even if the equitable defenses of laches and waiver are applicable, ERF has 
not established the elements necessary to establish such defenses 
Even if this Court finds that equitable defenses are applicable to claims before the 
Labor Commission, the elements necessary to establish a valid laches or waiver defense 
are not present here. In Borland ex rel. Utah Department of Social Services v. Chandler, 
733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held that to succeed in a laches 
defense, a defendant must establish (1) "that the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in 
bringing the action," and (2) "that the defendant was prejudiced by that delay.55 Id at 
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147. Thus, "even though the statutory period of limitations has lapsed, it may be that a 
claim is not barred by laches, such as where there has been no inexcusable delay in 
seeking a remedy or no prejudice to the defendant from the passage of time." 27 A Am. 
Jur. 2d Equity § 164 (West 2011). 
i) Unreasonable Delay 
Here, Mr. Henningson did not unreasonably delay in bringing the action. As 
discussed above, once the limitations period in section 35-1-98(2) has been satisfied and 
the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission is invoked under section 35-1-78, there is 
no time limit to bring a claim for permanent total disability. Thus, because there was no 
time limit, Mr. Henningson cannot be said to have unreasonably delayed bringing his 
claim for permanent total disability—nor can he be said to have waived his claim. 
ii) Prejudice to ERF 
ERF was not prejudiced by Mr. Henningson's filing for permanent total disability 
in 2007. As a reinsurer, ERF was not entitled to nor did it have a need for notice of Mr. 
Henningson's initial injury in 1993. Nevertheless, ERF did have notice. 
(1) Notice is not required 
ERF's maintains that it "never received notice of Mr. Henningson's permanent 
partial disability claim" and therefore it was prejudiced in this case because it had "no 
opportunity to adjust, defend, or timely evaluate this case." (Appellant ERF Br. at 26.) 
However, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, as a reinsurer, is not entitled to notice. 
ERF misconstrues its role in the workers compensation scheme. As a reinsurer, 
ERF insures insurers—specifically, workers compensation carriers. It is a secondary 
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insurer that manages an insurance pool funded by premiums assessed from all workers 
compensation insurer premiums in the State of Utah. ERF makes payments only after 
certain thresholds are met, and this is why it is referred to a reinsurer. See Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund's Actuarial Review of the Unpaid Claim Liability & Projected 
Financial Statements as of June 30, 2009 by Deloitte Consulting LLP at 1, attached 
hereto as Addendum C (hereinafter "Addendum C" or "Deloitte Report") ("For many 
years [ERF] acted as a reinsurer to the commercial insurance market for any claimants 
that exceeded a specific period of benefits with the private insurer or to pay the liability 
for pre-existing impairment of workers rendered disabled by an industrial accident."). 
Furthermore, ERF involvement in workers compensation cases is limited to only 
permanent and total disability cases occurring before 1994 and old surviving dependent 
cases. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-702 ("There is created an Employer's Reinsurance 
Fund for the purpose of making payments for industrial accidents or occupational 
diseases occurring on or before June 30, 1994"); see also Addendum C at 1 ("The [ERF] 
provides workers compensation benefits promptly and accurately to eligible disabled 
injured workers and their survivors from industrial accidents or occupational disease 
occurring on or before June 30, 1994.") 
In its role as a reinsurer, ERF does not normally adjust and does not initially 
defend or evaluate cases. This usually occurs many years later. ERF simply assesses a 
portion of all workers compensation insurance premiums in the State of Utah and 
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contributes only to a very limited number of cases.7 See Addendum C at 1 ("The ERF is 
funded by a surcharge on workers compensation premiums in the State and estimated 
workers compensation premiums for self-insured employers.")- As a workers 
compensation reinsurer, ERF enables workers compensation carriers to hedge their risk. 
For example, if an injured worker is awarded permanent and total disability and is still 
receiving benefits after 312 weeks or six (6) years have been paid, the ERF will step in 
and pay the continuing benefits.8 This way, workers compensation carriers are assured 
that they will never have to pay more than six years worth of permanent total disability 
payments because ERF assumes that risk. 
Importantly, any insurer, including ERF, can investigate at any time an individual 
presently on permanent and total disability (because of the Labor Commission's 
continuing jurisdiction) and can file a request with the Commission to have an injured 
workers permanent and total disability benefits terminated (which the ERF has done in 
the past). This can occur even twenty or more years after someone is granted permanent 
and total disability. Thus, because ERF can challenge permanent and total disability 
status at any time, ERF does not need initial notice of a worker's injury to protect its 
interests. 
ERF contends that there is a problem with stale evidence in the present case 
7
 On January 1, 2010, for example, the amount of that assessment was 3.50% of all workers compensation 
premiums; on January 1, 2009, the amount was 5.0%; and on January 1, 2008, the amount was a 7.5%. See 
Addendum C at 3. 
8
 The Deloitte Consulting Report notes that "for claimants with less than 10% whole man pre-existing permanent 
impairment, the ERF paid for compensation benefits after 312 weeks (6 years) but was not responsible for the 
reimbursement of medical expenses," and that "for claimants with more than a 10% whole man pre-existing 
permanent impairment, the ERF paid compensation benefits after 156 weeks (3 years) and reimbursed 50% of the 
medical expenses after the first $20,000 of expenses had been paid by the insurer of employer." Addendum C at 7. 
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because of the time lapse between the injury and the time the claim for permanent total 
disability was filed. In Vigos, the Utah Supreme Court considered the matter of stale 
evidence and concluded: 
[TJhere is no problem with stale evidence in this matter. The benefits 
which Vigos now seeks relates to his initial injury, which Mountainland 
and the Fund investigated and documented in depth. The record includes 
medical diagnosis and insurance papers outlining his initial injuries. 
2000 UT 2, Tf 23. Just as in Vigos, there is no problem with stale evidence in the present 
case. The benefits which Mr. Henningson currently seeks relate to his injury, which 
Sunnyside and the WCF investigated and documented in depth. Furthermore, the record 
is full of medical diagnosis and insurance papers outlining his initial injuries. 
Accordingly, ERF has ample evidence that it may examine and from which it may raise 
defenses. 
ERF also argues that because it did not receive initial notice of Henningson's 
injury, it did not have an opportunity to "adjust its accounts or provide for a reserve to 
pay future benefits that may be awarded." (Appellant ERF's Br. at 32.) The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that "[c]osts voluntarily undertaken in the face of a known risk 
of litigation cannot be used later to support a claim of prejudice due to laches." Sandy 
City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 227, 230 (Utah 1992). Likewise, reserves that were 
not maintained in the face of a known risk of litigation cannot be used to support a claim 
of prejudice due to laches. 
However, the Deloitte Report cited above demonstrates conclusively that ERF has 
taken steps to set aside reserves for cases just like Mr. Henningson's. Under the 
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subheading "Permanent total disability benefits - Incurred but not reported (IBNR) 
claims," Deloitte states the following: 
Based on historical claim reporting patterns, we estimated the projected 
number of PTD IBNR claims. Of these claims, we estimated that 60% of 
the claims will be closed by full and final settlements, 10% of the claims 
will be paid out over the life of the claimant and 30% of the claims will be 
closed without payment. To estimate the liability from full and final IBNR 
claims we multiplied the number of claims by an average full and final 
settlement per claim. To estimate the liability from IBNR claims that were 
paid out over the life of the claimant, we performed an annuity calculation 
assuming an average age of 58 and an average monthly payment of $1300. 
Addendum C at 13. Furthermore, a table entitled "Estimated Outstanding Liability" 
contains a line item called "Incurred But Not Reported Claims" where $16,249,047 is 
designated for such claims. Addendum C at 24. Thus, ERF has already taken into 
account the amount of reserves it should set aside to cover claims brought years after the 
initial injury occurred—despite ERF's contentions to the contrary. Nevertheless, even if 
this Court finds that Mr. Henningson's claim was not foreseeable and therefore was not 
accounted for by ERF, there is still no prejudice stemming from Mr. Henningson's 2007 
claim. It is the nature and role of a reinsurer to insure against the relatively unforeseeable 
in order to provide a backstop to the liability of primary insurers. 
Finally, Utah cases as well as prior Commission decisions demonstrate that the 
Commission has jurisdiction over a reinsurer, such as ERF, even where direct notice is 
not given, as long as the employer knew of the accident, accepted liability, and paid 
benefits. In other words, no initial notice of the injury need be given to a reinsurer to 
avoid prejudice. For example, in Mecham, the Utah Supreme Court held that the Second 
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Injury Fund, the predecessor to the ERF,9 was also a party liable for permanent total 
disability benefits in a case similar to the present case. 692 P.2d at 786 (concluding that 
"[t]he Secondary Injury Fund is to be reinstated as a party to the proceedings as required 
by section 35-1-67 for purposes of payment from the special fund"). Similarly, the Labor 
Commission, in Nelson v. Utah Local Governments Trust and Employers Reinsurance 
Fund, LC Case # 03-0037 (2005), held that the ERF was liable for permanent total 
disability benefits where the ERF made essentially the same arguments against liability as 
it has in the present case. Id, at 3 (holding that, "[bjecause [the claimant] is deemed to 
have filed a timely application, the Commission has continuing jurisdiction over her case 
and may determine the entire compensation to which she is entitled, including her right to 
permanent total disability compensation against the ERF"). 
In summary, it is the fact that ERF is a reinsurer that allows a finding of no 
prejudice where notice of an injury was not initially received. As a reinsurer, ERF is not 
normally involved with claims until it could be required to pay benefits—typically after 
the workers compensation carrier has paid a total of 3 to 6 years of permanent total 
disability benefits. Additionally, there are no problems with stale evidence in the present 
case and it is apparent that ERF has already taken steps to set aside reserves for such 
claims. Furthermore, relevant case law supports the view that notice is not required to 
include ERF as a party. Accordingly, ERF has not been prejudiced by a lack of notice of 
Mr. Henningson's initial injury. 
9
 See 34A-2-702 (stating that u[t]he Employers' Reinsurance Fund succeeds to all money previously held in the 
"Special Fund," the "Combined Injury Fund," or the "Second Injury Fund."). 
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(2) ERF Had Notice 
Nevertheless, even if this Court finds that ERF was required to have notice to 
avoid prejudice, this Court should find that ERF did indeed have notice. From the time 
of Mr. Henningson's accident on October 13, 1993 to the present, ERF has been part of 
the Industrial Accidents Division (IAD) within the Utah Labor Commission. 
Furthermore, the Director of the IAD also serves concurrently as the Administrator of the 
ERF. The Utah Labor Commission's FY 2007 Annual Report states, in relevant part: 
The [IAD] monitors all employers in the state for compliance with the 
workers' compensation insurance requirement and investigates and 
penalizes those employers who fail to comply; provides assistance to 
injured workers in resolving disputed claims informally; records all injuries 
in the state; provides assistance to injured workers in resolving disputes 
informally; records all injuries in the state; provides rules for claims 
handling; and administers the payment of benefits from two trust funds (the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund and the Employersy Reinsurance Fund). 
Addendum D (emphasis added). 
From the time of Mr. Henningson's accident to the start of the current litigation, 
the Director of the IAD and the Administrator of the ERF was Ms. Joyce Sewell. See i± 
As head of the ERF, Ms. Sewell was not a figurehead administrator, but was deeply 
involved in the minute details of the ERF. Moreover, as head of the Industrial Accidents 
Division, Ms. Sewell directed the office where all notices are filed, such as the 
Employer's First Report of Injury, Physician's First Report of Injury, compensation 
agreements, etc. See id. 
Hence, ERF had notice of Mr. Henningson's injury because its Administrator was 
also the individual directly over the Division at the Labor Commission, which receives all 
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notice documents. In other words, when notice documents were filed with the Industrial 
Accident Division, they were effectively filed simultaneously with the ERF, which is a 
sub-entity within the IAD. Since Ms. Sewell's retirement in December 2007, each 
successive Administrator of the Employer's Reinsurance Fund has simultaneously served 
as the Director of the Utah Labor Commission's Division of Industrial Accidents. 
Lastly, if nothing else, substantially relevant case law, such as the Utah Supreme 
Court's rulings in Spencer, Mecham, and Vigos, should have put ERF on notice as to the 
possibility of permanent total disability claims being asserted against it at a later date, 
such as after the six-year limitations period identified in section 35-1-98(2) has run. 
Thus, because ERF had actual and implied notice of Mr. Henningson's injury, ERF 
cannot now assert that it was prejudiced. 
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FAVOR THE LABOR COMMISSION'S 
AWARD OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS TO MR. 
HENNINGSON 
In Burgess the Utah Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he [Workers' Compensation] 
Act is a humanitarian and economical system designed to provide relief to victims of 
industrial accidents." 965 P.2d at 585. More specifically, the Burgess court stated: 
The Workers' Compensation Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme that 
provides remedies for injuries to workers occurring in the course of their 
employment, irrespective of fault, in lieu of common law tort actions. The 
Act provides temporary total disability benefits, . . . temporary partial 
diability benefits, . . . permanent partial and permanent total disability 
benefits, . . . and medical expenses for injured employees, . . . as well as 
certain other benefits. These remedies, whether viewed individually or 
together, are not analogous to an ordinary lump-sum judgment that the 
common law provides for personal injury actions. Not only may benefits be 
paid over a period of time rather than in a lumpsum judgment, but an 
award of benefits does not generally have the res judicata effect of a 
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judgment. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Stoker v. Workers' Comp. Fund & Indus. Comm'n, 889 P.2d 
409, 411 (Utah 1994)). The Burgess court went on to state, "[t]o give effect to that 
purpose, the Act should be liberally construed and applied to provide coverage. Any 
doubt respecting the right of compensation will be resolved in favor of the injured 
employee." 965 P.2d at 585; see also id. at 588 ("Continuing jurisdiction to award 
claimants all the benefits to which they are entitled as a result of an industrial accident is 
consistent with the common law principle of liberal construction in favor of injured 
employees that is at the heart of the [Workers' Compensation] Act."); Vigos, 2000 UT 2, 
f 13 ("We also wconstrue[] workers' compensation statutes liberally in favor of finding 
employee coverage.'" (quoting Olsen v. Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 
1998)). 
Here, the law should be construed liberally in favor of granting coverage to Mr. 
Henningson, an injured employee. The additional amount per month that Mr. 
Henningson will receive in permanent total disability benefits (approximately $1500) will 
enable him to subsist with at least some dignity. 
The Utah Courts have always been interested in how their decisions affect public 
policy, especially in complicated cases. See generally Intermountain Slurry Seal v. 
Stephens, 2002 UT App 114, 48 P.3d 352. Here, Appellants are seeking to transfer their 
statutory responsibility for the financial care of a disabled employee to other 
governmental (e.g. Medicare), social, or religious organizations—exactly what the 
workers compensation laws seek to avoid. Mr. Henningson is an uneducated, physically 
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and mentally impaired individual from a rural Utah town. Rather than actively assist Mr. 
Henningson through vocational rehabilitation as the law requires, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 
35-10-6, 35-10-7, WCF determined not to get involved and now wishes to avoid paying 
disability benefits. The workers compensation scheme was not established so that Utah's 
tax payers would bear the burden of paying for the care of an individual whose injuries 
were clearly the result of three specific industrial accidents at one coal mine in Central 
Utah—especially when that individual was covered by workers compensation insurance 
at the time. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the Labor Commission's award 
of permanent total disability benefits to Mr. Henningson. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \tp day of July, 2011. 
-1 KiM^y CM-
T. Jeffery Cotdb V\J Q 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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SUNNYSIDE COAL COMPANY and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND 
Respondent 
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" 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Case No. 07-0253 
Judge Debbie L. Hann 
HEARING: Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August 
20,2007 1:00 PM. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
BEFORE: Debbie L Hann, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner, Cecil Henningson, was present and represented by his 
attorney Jeffery Cottle Esq. 
The respondents, Sunnyside Coal Company and Workers Compensation 
Fund were represented by attorney Hans Scheffier Esq. 
The respondent, Employers Reinsurance Fund, was represented by 
attorney Edwin C Barnes Esq. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioner's March 14,2007 Application for Hearing alleges entitlement to permanent total 
disability compensation and interest as the result of a September 3,1993 low bade iiyury. The 
Commission initiated an adjudicative proceeding the following day with an Order for Answer. 
The respondents', Sunnyside Coal and Workers Compensation Fund (hereinafter "WCF"), April 
12,2007 Answer admitted the petitioner was sufifered a low back injury on October 13,1993 for 
which compensation was paid but denied the remaining allegations in the Application for lack of 
knowledge and affirmatively alleged the petitioner was not permanently totally disabled as the 
result of this industrial accident 
00186 
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The respondent's, Employers Reinsurance Fund (hereinafter "ERF1), April 13,2007 Answer 
denied the allegations in the Application for lack of knowledge and affirmatively alleged the 
petitioner is not permanently totally disabled as the result of the alleged accident nor that the 
petitioner suffered from a 10% pre-existing condition requiring apportionment of medical 
expenses with the other respondents* 
The petitioner filed an Amended Application for Hearing on May 10,2007 amending the date of 
injury to October 13,1993. WCF's Answer re-asserted the prior defenses and affirmatively 
alleged the petitioner's claim was batted by the statute of limitations and that the petitioner 
suffered from at least a 15% whole person impairment prior to the October 13,1993 accident 
Prior to the hearing, WCF filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting the petitioner's claim 
is barred by Utah Code § 35-1-98(2) because the petitioner did not file an Application for 
Hearing with the Commission within 6 years after the date of the accident The petitioner 
opposed the motion. The Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The petitioner was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with 
the respondent Sunnyside Coal Company, on October 13,1993. This accident resulted in a low 
back injury. Prior to this injury, the suffered from at least a 10% pre-existing condition. 
The petitioner suffered several prior back injuries as the result of accidents while employed by 
Sunnyside Coal. After the October 13,1993 industrial accident, the petitioner underwent a third 
back surgery. The petitioner's last day worked was October 13,1993, the day of the industrial 
accident The petitioner was paid by temporary total disability compensation and permanent 
partial disability compensation by WCF following the October 13,1993 accident Dr. 
Momberger assigned a 22% whole person impairment for the petitioner's low back condition on 
December 14,1995. The last compensation payment was made by WCF on June 8,1995. 
The petitioner was awarded Social Security disability compensation on April 28,1995 for a 
disability onset date of October 14,1993. The basis of the award was the petitioner's tow back 
condition as the result of the October 13,1993 accident A significant cause of the petitioner's 
disability for which he receives Social Security is the October 13,1993 industrial accident 
The petitioner is tentatively permanently totally disabled as the result of the October 13,1993 
industrial accident The petitioner never returned to gainful employment following this accident 
The petitioner was paid temporary total disability compensation following this injury through 
December IS, 1994. The petitioner is tentatively permanently totally disabled as the result of 
this industrial injury beginning December 16, 1994. 
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The parties stipulated the petitioner's weekly compensation rate for this claim is $351.00. 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
The Commission can rely on a Social Security disability determination of disability to find an 
injured worker permanently totally disabled if a significant cause of the disability is caused by 
the industrial accident R612-l-lO(B),U.A.a 
Utah Code § 35-1-98(2) (effective on October 13,1993) states: 
A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary partial 
disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total disability 
benefits is barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the commission within 
sue years after the date of the accident 
Utah Code § 35-1-78(1) (effect on October 13,1993) states: 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The 
commission, after notice and bearing, may from time to time, modify or change its 
former findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and 
inactive for ten years, other than cases of permanent total disability or cases in which a 
claim has been filed as in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion of die 
commission. 
The Utah Supreme Court mteipreted the interplay between these two provisions of the Woricers 
Compensation Act as it relates to claims filed with the Commission more than 6 years after the 
injury date in Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc.. 993 ?2d 207 (Utah 2000). 
In that case, Vigos* claim for compensation had been accepted and paid by the carrier so he 
never filed an application for hearing with the Commission until more than 6 years after his 
injury date when he made a claim for permanent total disability compensation which had been 
denied by the earner. The Court held that the statute of limitations requirements of Utah Code 
35-1-98(2/ were met when u...the required forms were filed, disability benefits paid and 
medical expenses compensated before the six-year period ended*' Jd.at2l4. Once this had 
been met, the Commission acquired continuing jurisdiction under Utah Code § 35-1-78, which 
has no time limitation. 
1
 This provision was found at Utah Code § 35-1-99(3) at the time Mr. Vigos* claim arose. 
** 00.1 S8 
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In this case, the respondent asserts that the petitioner's claim for permanent total disability 
compensation 'Vested*1 at the time he was awarded Social Security Disability compensation 
based upon his low back condition which was caused by the industrial accident, as well as 
various doctors opinions stating he was disabled as well as bis inability to work and lack of 
gainful employment As a result, the respondents assert that by waiting until 2007 to file his 
claim for permanent total disability compensation, his claim fails under Utah Code § 35-1-98. 
The Court's decision in Vieos makes clear however, that once notice of the claim is given within 
6 years, the statute of limitations in § 35-1-98 is met and the Commission then retains continuing 
jurisdiction to hear subsequent claims and that there is no time limit to that continuing 
jurisdiction. There is nothing in the language of Utah Code § 35-1-78 or 35-1-98 that places an 
additional requirement that an injured worker's time limits for filing a claim are based upon 
when he knew or should have known he had a claim for additional compensation. Although the 
Court in Vieos cites facts that during the period after Mr. Vigos received temporary total 
disability compensation and his claim for permanent total disability compensation, he attempted 
to work and rehabilitate himself following the injury, these facts are incidental to the Court's 
reasoni ng and interpretation of the operation of Utah Code § 35-1-98 and 35-1-78. 
The ruling in Vieos also applies to the ERR In Nelson v. Utah Local Governments Trust and 
Employers Reinsurance Fund. LC Case # 03-0037, the Commission rejected the ERF's assertion 
that the six year statute of limitations is not met as to the ERF when the carrier pays 
compensation. 
Upon a finding of tentative permanent total disability under Utah Code § 35-1-67 (effective on 
October 13,1993), the case is required to be referred to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation. 
Utah Code § 35-1-67(5) (effective on October 13,1993) unless otherwise agreed by the parties. 
The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally 
disabled., .and ends with the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning 
to regular, steady work." Utah Code § 35-l-67(5)(b)(iv) (effective on October 13,1993). 
Utah Code § 35*1-69 (effective on October 13,1993) requires the ERF to pay the first 
$20,000.00 of medical benefits and 50% of the medical expenses thereafter along with the initial 
three years of permanent total disability compensation when an injured worker who has at least a 
10% whole person impairment from any cause incurs an additional impairment that results in 
permanent total disability. 
Permanent total disability compensation is reduced by 50% of Social Security retirement benefits 
received by an injured worker. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Findings of Fact. Conclui s of Law and Order 
Cecil Henningson vs. Sunnyside Coal Company and/or Workers Compensation Fund, Employers 
Reinsurance Fund 
Case No. 07-0253 
Page 5 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The petitioner suffered a compensable industrial injury on October 13,1993 while employed by 
the respondent, Sunnyside Coal Company. 
The petitioner is tentatively permanently totally disabled as the result of the October 13,1993 
industrial accident. 
The respondents are liable to the petitioner for permanent total disability compensation for the 
period December 16,1994 through December 8,2002 (first 312 weeks) in die amount of 
$ 109,512.00 less credit to WCF for payment of permanent partial disability compensation in the 
amount of $6,864.00 plus interest less attorney's fees. The amount payable by WCF for this 
period is $47,892.00 plus interest The amount payable by ERF for this period is $54,756.00 
plus interest 
The respondent, ERF, is liable to the petitioner for permanent total disability compensation for 
the period December 9,2002 through November 13,2007 (25728 weeks) in the amount of 
$351.00 per week for a total of $90,305.28 plus interest 
The respondent, ERF, is liable to the petitioner for ongoing permanent total disability 
compensation beginning November 14,2007 at the rate of $351.00 per week and continuing until 
the petitioner dies or is capable of returning to regular steady work. This amount, or 36% of the 
current state average weekly wage rounded to the nearest dollar, whichever is higher, shall be 
reduced by 50% of any Social Security retirement benefits the petitioner may receive. 
The respondent, WCF is entitled to reimbursement from the respondent, ERF for the first 
$20,000.00 of medical benefits and 50% of the medical expenses thereafter. 
The petitioner shall be referred to Utah State Office of Rehabilitation for evaluation. The ERF is 
liable to (he Utah State Office of Rehabilitation for an amount not to exceed $3,000.00 for use in 
the rehabilitation and training of the petitioner. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that die respondents pay the petitioner for permanent total 
disability compensation for the period December 16,1994 through December 8,2002 (first 312 
weeks) in die amount of $109,512.00 less credit to WCF for payment of permanent partial 
disability compensation in the amount of $6,864.00 plus interest less attorney's fees awarded 
below. The amount payable by WCF for this period is $47,892.00. The amount payable by ERF 
for this period is $54,756.00. These amounts are accrued and due and payable plus mterest at the 
rate of 8% per annum* 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent, ERF, pay the petitioner for permanent total 
disability compensation for the period December 9,2002 through November 13,2007 (257.28 
weeks) in the amount of $351.00 per week for a total of $90,305.28. This amount is accrued and 
due and payable plus interest at the rate of 8% per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent, ERF, deduct from the amounts payable to 
the petitioner the amount of $12,250.00 as attorney's fees and pay this amount directly to Jeffrey 
Cottle, Attorney at Law. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent, ERF, pay the petitioner for ongoing 
permanent total disability compensation beginning November 14,2007 at the rate of $351.00 per 
week and continuing until the petitioner dies or is capable of returning to regular steady work. 
This amount, or 36% of the current state average weekly wage rounded to the nearest dollar, 
whichever is higher, shall be reduced by 50% of any Social Security retirement benefits the 
petitioner may receive. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent, WCF is entitled to reimbursement from the 
respondent, ERF for the first $20,000.00 of medical benefits and 50% of the medical expenses 
thereafter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitioner shall be referred to Utah State Office of 
Rehabilitation for evaluation. The ERF shall pay to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation an 
amount not to exceed $3,000.00 for use in rehabilitation and training of the petitioner. 
DATED this 
f&QHt" 
Debbie L. Hann 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication Division 
of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific basts for 
00.191 ^ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
Findings of Fact, Conclu .is of Law and Order 
Cecil Hcnningson vs. Sunnyside Coal Company and/or Workers Compensation Fund, Employers 
Reinsurance Fund 
Case No. 07-0253 
Page 7 
review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this decision is 
signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days 
of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the 
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
CECIL HENNINGSON, | 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SUNNYSIDE COAL COMPANY, 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND and 
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND, 
Respondents. 
| ORDER ON MOTION 
FORREVD2W 
Case No. 07-0253 
Sunnyside Coal Company and its insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund, (referred to 
jointly as "Sunnyside1*) and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("ERF'*) ask the Utah Labor 
Commission to review Administrative Law Judge Harm's decision awarding permanent total 
disability compensation to Cecil Henningson under the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act1 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to § 63G-
4-301 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and § 34A-2-801(3) of the Utah Workers 
Compensation Act 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Mr. Henningson's Application For Hearing, filed with the Commission on March 14,2007, 
claims permanent total disability compensation for back injuries from a work accident at Sunnyside 
Coal Company on October 13,1993. Judge Hann held an evidentiary hearing and then awarded the 
requested compensation. Judge Hann also apportioned liability for Mr. Henningson's disability 
compensation and medical expenses between Sunnyside and the ERF. 
In requesting review of Judge Harm's decision, Sunnyside and the ERF argue that Mr. 
Henningson's claim for permanent total disability compensation is barred by § 98 (2) of the Act. 
They also argue that, even if the claim is not barred by § 98 (2), Mr. Henningson has not shown 
circumstances that would allow the Commission to grant benefits as an exercise of the Commission's 
continuing jurisdiction under § 78 of the Act. Finally, in the event that Mr. Henningson's claim is 
allowed, the ERF contests its liability to reimburse Sunnyside for Mr. Henningson's initial medical 
expenses, while Sunnyside argues it is only liable for the first 156 weeks of Mr. Henningson's 
permanent total disability compensation. 
1
 On October 13, 1993, the date of Mr. Henningson's accident and injury, the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act was codified as Title 35, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated. This decision refers 
to the substantive provisions of the Act as they were codified on that date. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
The following facts are material to the issues raised by Sunnyside and the ERF. 
Mr. Henningson worked in the coal mining industry for many years prior to October 13, 
1993, the date of the accident that gives rise to his current claim for permanent total disability 
compensation. During those earlier years as a miner, Mr. Henningson was involved in several work 
accidents and underwent two back surgeries, leaving him with permanent, whole-person impairments 
totaling at least 10%. 
On October 13,1993, while Mr. Henningson was working for Sunnyside as a roof bolter, he 
attempted to lift a heavy device known as a "stopper." As a result of this exertion, Mr. Henningson 
again injured his back and underwent a third back surgery. All reports required by the Commission 
were filed at the time of the accident and Sunnyside accepted liability for Mr. Henningson's workers' 
compensation benefits. Specifically, Sunnyside paid for Mr. Henningson's medical care, temporary 
total disability compensation, and permanent partial disability compensation. 
Mr. Henningson reached medical stability from the October 1993 accident and subsequent 
surgery on December 15, 1994. As a result of the accident, his permanent, whole-person 
impairments increased to a total of 22%. In April 1995, the Social Security Administration awarded 
social security disability benefits to Mr. Henningson, based on the Administration's findings that he: 
1) had a severe injury; 2) could not perform the work he had done in the past; and 3) could not 
perform other types of work, 
Mr. Henningson never returned to work or looked for work after the October 1993 accident 
Sunnyside and the ERF concede that Mr. Henningson is now permanently and totally disabled. Mr. 
Henningson did not file an application with the Commission to claim permanent total disability 
compensation until March 14,2007. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The parties agree Mr. Henningson's injury from the October 1993 accident at Sunnyside is 
generally compensable under the Utah Workers* Compensation Act. They also concede that Mr. 
Henningson is now permanently and totally disabled as a result of the injury. What is in dispute is 
whether Mr. Henningson's delay in bringing his claim for permanent total disability compensation 
precludes him from receiving those benefits. Additionally, in the event Mr. Henningson is entitled to 
benefits, Sunnyside and the ERF dispute Judge Hann's allocation of liability for those benefits. 
These issues are addressed below. 
Section 98 (2) as a bar to M r Henningson's claim. Mr. Henningson did not file an 
application for permanent total disability compensation until more than 13 years after the accident. 
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Section 98 (2) provides that "[a] claim for compensation for... permanent total disability benefits is 
wholly barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the [Labor Commission] within six 
years after the date of the accident." 
The proper interpretation of § 98 (2)'s six-year filing requirement was considered by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, et al, 993 P.2d 207 (Utah 2000). In that 
case, Mr. Vigos was injured at work during October 1988. The injury was properly reported and the 
employer's insurance carrier voluntarily paid medical benefits, temporary total disability 
compensation and permanent partial disability compensation. For several years, Mr. Vigos 
attempted unsuccessfully to return to work. Finally, after receiving a social security determination 
that he was totally disabled, Mr. Vigos filed an application for permanent total disability 
compensation with the Commission on July 11,1995, more than six years after the accident 
The Commission denied Mr. Vigos's claim for failure to satisfy § 98 (2)'s six-year filing 
requirement After the case came before the Utah Supreme Court, the Court issued three separate 
opinions: 
• The plurality decision, written by Justice Stewart and joined by Justice Durham, held 
that § 98 (2)'s six-year filing requirement was satisfied if "required forms were filed, 
disability benefits paid, and medical expenses compensated before the six-year period 
ended" Vigos at 213. Because those steps had been taken in Mr. Vigos's case, Justice 
Steward and Justice Durham held that Mr. Vigos had met the filing requirement. 
• Justice Russon issued a separate opinion concurring in the result reached by Justices 
Stewart and Durham, but for a different reason. Justice Russon concluded that Mountainland 
and its insurance carrier "are estopped from invoking [§ 98 (2)*s six-year filing requirement] 
because they have already granted disability benefits to Vigos without demanding 
compliance with the application requirement" Vigos at 216. 
• The third decision, a dissent written by Chief Justice Howe and joined by Justice 
Zimmerman, would have strictly applied the six-year filing requirement as a bar to Mr. 
Vigos's claim. 
The logic of either the plurality or concurring Vigos decisions compels the conclusion in this 
case that Mr. Henningson's claim for permanent total disability compensation is not barred by § 98 
(2). Justice Stewart and Justice Durham's rationale is satisfied because required reports regarding 
Mr. Henningson's claim were timely filed, and medical, temporary total, and permanent partial 
benefits were paid before the six-year filing period ended. Justice Russon's rationale is satisfied 
because Sunnyside's voluntary payment of benefits to Mr. Henningson estops Sunnyside from now 
demanding compliance with § 98 (2). The Commission therefore concludes that Mr. Henningson's 
claim is not barred by § 98 (2) and the Commission has "original jurisdiction" jurisdiction over the 
claim. See Vigos at 215. 
Continuing jurisdiction to award benefits. As discussed above, the Commission has 
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original jurisdiction over Mr. Henningson's workers' compensation claim. However, Sunnyside and 
the ERF argue that the Commission's jurisdiction does not extend so far as to allow an award of 
permanent total disability compensation to Mr. Henningson for an injury that has existed with no 
significant change since December 1994, the date he reached medical stability from his injury. 
a 
Section 78 (1) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides that: "[t]he powers and 
jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing/' In Spencer v. Industrial 
Commission, 733 P.2d 158 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court observed that u[t]he power of the 
[Labor] Commission to modify awards when cin its opinion' modification is justified is not an 
arbitrary power,... but a power wedded to the duty to examine credible evidence. Under well- € 
established principles of stare decisis, the basis of modification is provided by evidence of some 
significant change or new development in the claimant's injury or proof of the previous award's 
inadequacy," (Internal citations omitted; emphasis added.) 
Sunnyside and the ERF argue that Mr. Henningson has not shown any change of C 
circumstances to justify reopening his claim to award permanent total disability compensation. That 
argument overlooks the Commission's continuing jurisdiction to award benefits upon ilproof of the 
previous award's inadequacy." Spencer, ibid. In this case, Mr. Henningson has been permanently 
and totally disabled since December 16, 1994. Although he received some compensation for 
temporary total and permanent partial disability, he never received the permanent total disability G 
compensation to which he was entitled. Under the statutory provisions of the Act in effect at the 
time of Mr. Henningson's accident, the scope of the Commission's continuing jurisdiction is 
sufficient to reach and correct this inadequacy. 
The Commission notes that the 1999 Utah Legislature amended the Utah Workers' Q 
Compensation Act to place a 12-year time limit on the Commission's continuing jurisdiction- See 
Ortega v. Meadow Valley Construction, 996 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Utah 2000). Such a legislative 
modification of the Commission's continuing jurisdiction would not seem to be necessary if 
Sunnyside and the ERF's arguments regarding the extent of such jurisdiction were correct. The 
Legislature's action in 1999 addresses many of the policy issues identified by Sunnyside and the Q 
ERF. However, neither Sunnyside nor the ERF argue that the 1999 amendment, enacted several 
years after Mr. Henningson's accident, can be applied to his claim. 
Sunnyside and ERF liability for benefits. Section 69 of the Act establishes the conditions 
under which die ERF must share an employer/insurance carrier's liability for payment of benefits in ^ 
cases of permanent total disability. The statute provides that, if a permanently and totally disabled 
worker had at least a 10% whole-person impairment prior to his or her work accident, then the 
employer/insurer is liable for the first $20,000 in medical expenses. After the employer/insurance 
carrier has paid that amount, additional medical expenses are divided equally between the ERF and 
the employer/insurer. Judge Hann's order mistakenly reverses this statutory formula by requiring the < 
ERF to pay the initial $20,000 of Mr. Henningson's medical expenses. The Commission will modify 
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Judge Harm's order to correct that error. 
Section 69 also provides that, in cases involving a preexisting 10% impairment, the 
employer/insurer is liable for the injured worker's first three years of permanent total disability 
compensation. Thereafter, the ERF is liable to pay continuing benefits. Because Mr. Henningson 
had at least a 10% impairment prior to his October 1993 accident, Sunnyside is only liable for the 
first three years Mr. Henningson's permanent total disability compensation. The Commission will 
modify Judge Hann's order accordingly. 
Finally, in light of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Merrill v. Labor Commission et al, 
227 P.3d 1099 (Utah 2009), the Commission will strike that part of Judge Hann's order that 
authorizes the ERF to offset Mr. Henningson's future social security retirement benefits against his 
on-going permanent total disability compensation. 
ORDER 
The Commission hereby modifies the terms of Judge Hann's order, found at pages five and 
six of her decision, as follows: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Sunnyside Coal Company and Workers Compensation Fund 
pay permanent total disability compensation to Cecil Henningson at the rate of $351 per week, 
commencing on December 16,1994, and continuing for 156 weeks thereafter, until December 9, 
1997. Sunnyside Coal Company and Workers Compensation Fund are entitled to a credit against 
this liability for their prior payments of permanent partial disability compensation totaling $6,8645. 
Sunnyside Coal Company and Workers Compensation Fund shall also pay interest to Cecil 
Henningson at 8% per annum on any unpaid disability compensation. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay permanent total 
disability compensation to Cecil Henningson at the rate of $351 per week or 36% of the current state 
average weekly wage rounded to the nearest dollar, whichever is higher. The Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund shall commence these payments as of December 9,1997, and continue them until 
Mr. Henningson dies or until further order of the Commission. The Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
shall also pay interest to Cecil Henningson at 8% per annum on any accrued but unpaid disability 
compensation. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund deduct $12,250 from the 
amount otherwise payable to Cecil Henningson and pay this amount directly to Jeffrey Cottle as his 
fee for serving as Mr. Henningson's attorney in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund shall reimburse Sunnyside 
and Workers Compensation Fund for 50% of their payments of Mr. Henningson's medical expenses 
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that are in excess of a total of $20,000. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Henningson shall be referred to Utah State Office of 
Rehabilitation for evaluation. The Employers1 Reinsurance Fund shall pay to the Utah State Office 
of Rehabilitation anamount not to exceed $3,000,00 for use in Mr. Hennihgson's rehabilitation iand 6 
training. 
It is so ordered. 
Dated this rfj day of December, 2010. 6 
Sherrie Hayashi 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order On Motion For Review in fee matter of Cecil 
Henningson, Case No. 07-0253, was mailed first class postage prepaid this^Tfday of December, 
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Larry D. Bunkall 
Division Director 
State of Utah - Labor Commission 
Industrial Accidents Division 
160 East 300 South 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6610 
Dear Mr. Bunkall: 
We are pleased to provide this report of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("ERF") unpaid claim 
liability analysis and projected financial statements as of June 30, 2009. The unpaid claim liability 
estimates and future estimates of revenue and expenses in this report have been calculated using 
commonly accepted actuarial principles, appropriate actuarial methods and reasonable assumptions. 
We have enjoyed working with you and your staff on this analysis. If you or any other member of 
your team has any questions or comments about this report, please give us a call at one of the phone 
numbers listed below. 
Sincerely, 
5£ fT\« 
Rod Moms, FCAS, MAAA 
Specialist Leader 
(213)688-3374 




Doiotto Touche Tohmotsu 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Employers3 Reinsurance Fund 
Table of Contents 
Page 
I. Executive Summary 1 
II. Background 7 
III. Scope, Distribution, and Limitations 9 
IV. Overview of Analysis 12 
V. Data Sources 18 
VI. Exhibits 20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
I. Executive Summary 
Scope of Report 
Deloitte Consulting LLP ("Deloitte Consulting") has been engaged by the State of Utah Labor 
Commission to provide a review of the unpaid claim liability and assessment rates for the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund ("ERF") monitored by the Industrial Accidents Division ('the Division"). The 
purpose of this review includes the following items: 
• Provide an estimate of the unpaid claim liability to assist the Labor Commission in 
preparing the financial statements of the ERF as of June 30, 2009. The unpaid claim 
liability is estimated and provided on an undiscounted and discounted basis to reflect the 
time value of money. 
• Based on the results of the unpaid claim liability analysis and projections of future 
revenue and expenses, provide recommendations regarding adjustments to the percentage 
surcharge on premiums ("assessment rates") to be assessed by the Commission to each 
provider of workers compensation insurance in the State of Utah. 
• Based on the above recommendations, provide projected future financial results, 
including revenue and expense projections, through fiscal year 2025. 
The intended measure of the unpaid claim liability estimates in this report is an actuarial central 
estimate, which represents an expected value over the range of reasonably possible outcomes. We 
have not attempted to measure the uncertainty in the estimates. For the remainder of this report and 
the exhibits, the term "unpaid loss" or "unpaid claim liability" is sometimes referred to as "reserves". 
In this report, these terms are used interchangeably. 
Background 
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("ERF' or "Fund") provides workers compensation benefits 
promptly and accurately to eligible disabled injured workers and their survivors from industrial 
accidents or occupational disease occurring on or before June 30, 1994. In addition, the Fund makes 
payments of reasonable costs and fees to administer the ERF. The Fund also provided workers 
compensation benefits to any injured workers who were not covered by workers compensation 
insurance. For many years the Fund acted as a reinsurer to the commercial insurance market for any 
claimants that exceeded a specific period of benefits with the private insurer or to pay the liability for 
pre-existing impairment of workers rendered disabled by an industrial accident. 
The ERF is currently in run-off mode. Beginning July 1,1994, the ERF no longer acts as the reinsurer 
to the commercial insurance market. Private insurers now pay for the workers compensation benefits 
of all claimants regardless of duration of the claim or pre-existing impairment of the disabled worker. 
The ERF is funded by a surcharge on workers compensation premiums in the State and estimated 
workers compensation premiums for self-insured employers. 
1 
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Proposed Future Assessment Rates 
The ERF "Fund Balance'* at any given time is the amount of the assets in the fund less the liabilities of 
the fund. Based on estimates of the unpaid claim liability, the ERF Fund Balance is deficient by $50.8 
million as of June 30, 2009. In other words, the current assets are $50.8 million less than the current 
liabilities. As mentioned previously, the current deficit does not include a provision for any potential 
retroactive payments that may be required for payments already made and offset by social security 
benefits. 
As part of our analysis, we have estimated future ERF expenses and revenue through fiscal year 2025. 
The purpose of this analysis is to review the viability of several alternative future assessment rates with 
the goal of the ERF becoming fully funded (i.e. assets > liabilities) and remaining so through fiscal 
year 2025. These results were presented to the Workers Compensation Advisory Council to help the 
Labor Commission adopt a 2010 premium assessment rate for the ERF. Below is a summary of results 
of the projection analysis under several alternative future assessment rates. 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund @06/30/09 
fl Calendar Year 
1 Actual 2008 
1 Actual 2009 
1 Proposed 2010 
1 Proposed 2011 
1 Proposed 2012 
1 Proposed 2013 
9 Proposed 2014 
1 Proposed 2015 
I Year ERF Fully Funded 
Balance as of Fiscal Year 2025 
























































Under the current statutory maximum assessment rates, the ERF would become fully funded in fiscal 
year 2012, but the Fund Balance in fiscal year 2025 would be approximately $24.6 million which is 
well in excess of the required balance. The analysis above would indicate that there are two alternative 
options to appropriately fund the ERF at a funded balance close to break even. A constant assessment 
rate at 3.25% would fully fund the ERF in fiscal year 2012 and the fund would remain fully funded 
through fiscal year 2025 with a reasonable provision for any future unknown contingencies. A 
declining assessment rate starting with 3.5% in fiscal year 2010 and declining thereafter could 
basically accomplish the same result as the constant assessment rate except that the ERF would 
become fully funded in fiscal year 2013. 
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Projected Future Financial Results 
At the October 7, 2009 meeting of the Advisory Council and Open Meeting, the Utah Labor 
Commission decided to adopt a calendar year 2010 premium assessment rate for the ERF of 3.5%. 
Therefore, we have used the declining assessment rate assumption shown previously in estimating our 
revenue for the future financial results. 
In order to project future financial results, estimates of future revenue and expenses is required. Future 
revenue sources include premium revenues from tax assessments and investment income on cash 
balances within the fund. The cash balance of the fund represents the majority of the assets of the 
fund. Future expenses include claim payments, medical reimbursements to insurers, and other 
administrative expenses. We note that beginning in fiscal year 2010, the other administrative expense 
includes ERF staff salaries directly related to the administration of the ERF. 
Below is a summary of the historical revenue and expenses from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 
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As can be seen, revenue has been significantly higher than the expenses in recent years in order to 
lower the fund deficiency. Expenses will exceed the revenue once the ERF is fully funded and 
assessment rates terminate. 
As mentioned previously, the current fund balance as of June 30, 2009 is a deficit of $50.8 million. 
The asset balances as of June 30, 2009 is approximately $190.8 million of which approximately 95% 
represents cash invested with the treasurer's office. The remaining assets represent a premium tax 
receivable. The liability balance as of June 30, 2009 is approximately $241.6 million which is 
essentially our estimate of the unpaid claim liability as of June 30, 2009. The fund's estimated future 
4 
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IL Background 
History 
In 1917, the Utah Legislature passed the Workers Compensation Act, which required all employers in 
Utah to obtain workers compensation insurance coverage. In 1919, the "Special Fund" was created to 
pay the liability for pre-existing impairment of workers rendered disabled by an industrial accident. 
The new fund removed a disincentive to hiring the handicapped, while at the same time broadening the 
base of responsibility for pre-existing conditions. Through the years the definition of "pre-existing 
impairment" and what was covered by the Special Fund was changed through Statute and in 1981 the 
"Special Fund" was renamed the "Second Injury Fund." 
On July 1,1988, the Second Injury Fund was renamed the Employers* Reinsurance Fund ("ERF") and 
the statue was completely re-written. 
Benefits Prior to July 1,1988 
Prior to July 1, 1988, the ERF reimbursed carriers for a portion of the compensation benefits and all 
medical expenses after 312 weeks for permanent total disability claimants. The proportionate share of 
compensation benefits was based on the ratio of pre-exhibiting impairment to total impairment. 
Initially, there was no minimum threshold for the amount of pre-existing impairment before the ERF 
incurred any liability but the statute was eventually changed to require that a minimum threshold of 
10% whole man pre-existing permanent impairment be required before the ERF incurred any liability. 
Benefits on July 1,1988 and Subsequent 
On July 1, 1988, the statute changed significantly to separate claimants receiving ERF coverage into 
two groups. First, for claimants with less than 10% whole man pre-existing permanent impairment, the 
ERF paid for compensation benefits after 312 weeks (6 years) but was not responsible for the 
reimbursement of any medical expenses. Second, for claimants with more than a 10% whole man pre-
existing permanent impairment, the ERF paid compensation benefits after 156 weeks (3 years) and 
reimbursed 50% of the medical expenses after the first $20,000 of expenses had been paid by the 
insurer or employer. 
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Employers'Reinsurance Fund 
except that we used the 1983 group annuitant mortality table for mortality rates of claimants receiving 
survivor benefits. 
Permanent total disability benefits - Incurred but not reported (IBNR) claims 
Although the ERF has been in run-off for several years, the fund does continue to receive IBNR 
claims. These IBNR claims can materialize in several ways. We have listed a few ways below in 
which IBNR claims materialize. 
• Re-Opened WCF Claims: When WCF implemented its claim system in 1993, 
only open claims and claims with occurrence dates in 1987 and subsequent were 
included. Occasionally, a pre-1987 claim will re-open and qualify for ERF 
reimbursement. Therefore, the claim may show up as a new ERF claim. 
• Recent Retirees: It is common for an attorney to contact prior claimants when 
they retire to discuss if early retirement was due to a continuing problem with a 
prior injury. Since there is no statute of limitations on PTD claims, these 
claimants may qualify for ERF reimbursement. 
• Occupational Disease Claims (e.g. Asbestosis claims): These claims can take 
many years to manifest. 
Based on historical claim reporting patterns, we estimated the projected number of PTD IBNR claims. 
Of these claims, we estimated that 60% of the claims will be closed by full and final settlements, 10% 
of the claims will be paid out over the life of the claimant and 30% of the claims will be closed without 
payment. To estimate the liability from full and final IBNR claims we multiplied the number of claims 
by an average full and final settlement per claim. To estimate the liability from IBNR claims that were 
paid out over the life of the claimant, we performed an annuity calculation assuming an average age of 
58 and an average monthly payment of $1,300. The annuity calculation was performed using the 
methodology listed in the "Permanent total disability benefits - active claims" section above. The 
percentage distribution of claims, average full and final payment, average age of claimant and average 
monthly payment were selected based on the historical data we received from the Division. 
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STATE OF UTAH - LABOR COMMISSION 
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND 
AS OF JUNE 30,2009 
ESTIMATED OUTSTANDING LIABILITY 
EXHIBIT 1 
UNDISCOUNTED DISCOUNTED" 
(1) PERMANENT DISABILITY (ACTIVE CLAIMS) $ 320,254,101 $ 205,755,335 
(2) SURVIVOR BENEFITS (ACTIVE CLAIMS) 
(3) INCURRED BUT NOT REPORTED CLAIMS 
(4) MEDICAL REIMBURSEMENTS 
(5) SETTLEMENT EXPENSES 










372,310,266 $ 241,487,483 
(1) DISCOUNTED LIABILITY FROM SECTION 1, EXHIBIT 4, DETAIL 
(2) DISCOUNTED LIABILITY FROM SECTION 1, EXHIBIT 5, SHEET 1 
(3) DISCOUNTED LIABILITY FROM SECTION 1, EXHIBIT 2, SHEET 1 
(4) FROM COL (12), COL (11) OF SECTION 1, EXHIBIT 3, SHEET 1 
(5) FROM COL (9), COL (8) OF SECTION 1, EXHIBIT 3, SHEET 1 
(6) TOTAL OF ROW (1) TO ROW (5) 
(7) TOTAL OF ROW (1) TO ROW (6) 
* On April 24, 2009. the Utah Supreme Court ruled In Manill v. Verniex of Ft. Inc.. et al. that the Social Security retirement offset provision is unconstitutional. 
Therefore, our estimates exclude any reduction due to future soda! security benefits. Our estimates do not indude a provision for any potential 
retroactive payments the Employers' Reinsurance Fund may be required to pay in the future. 
** Interest rate used for discounting future claim payments was 2.5% for the next three years increasing to 4.5% thereafter. 
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The Division is responsible for the administration of the Workers' Compensation Act, which has 
been a state program since 1917. The intent of the workers' compensation program is to provide 
medical care and lost wages to injured workers in exchange for employer immunity from personal 
injury lawsuits by their employees. The division monitors all employers in the state for compliance 
with the workers' compensation insurance requirement and investigates and penalizes those 
employers who fail to comply; provides assistance to injured workers in resolving disputed claims 
informally; records all injuries in the state; provides rules for claims handling; and administers the 
payment of benefits from two trust funds (the Uninsured Employers' Fund and the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund). 
ENFORCEMENT 
Workers' Compensation Act (Utah Code 34A-2 and 34A-3) 
INTERNAL EFFICIENCIES 
The Division is currently developing a system to electronically receive workers' compensation 
claim information which will allow staff more time to work with disputed claims. 
FY07 HIGHLIGHTS 
Claims Section 
• Recorded information on over 68,000 reported injuries. 
• Processed over 225,000 documents related to industrial 
injuries. 
• Responded to approximately 36,000 information phone calls. 
• Assisted over 1,200 non English speaking claimants with 
information and claim disputes. 
Policy Section 
• Monitored over 77,000 employers for insurance coverage 
compliance. 
• Investigated over 6,000 employers for non-compliance with 
workers' compensation, resulting in the issuing of over 1,500 penalties. 
• Collected approximately $3 million in penalties from uninsured employers to assist in the 
payment of uninsured claims through the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
• Brought over 2,500 employers into compliance with the workers' compensation system. 
• Certified 80 of the state's largest employers for workers' compensation self-insurance. 
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